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Abstract. In response to media exposés and activist group pressure to eliminate exploitive

working conditions, multinational companies have pushed their suppliers to adopt labor
codes of conduct and improve their labor practices to meet the standards set forth in these
codes. Yet little is known about the extent to which suppliers are improving their labor
practices to conform to codes of conduct, especially in organizations in which legitimacy
structures like codes compete with productivity-driving incentive structures. We theorize that
the presence of particular internal structures will affect the extent to which suppliers’ labor
practices will become more tightly aligned—or coupled—with their formal commitments to
adhere to labor codes. Speciﬁcally, we theorize high-powered productivity incentives to be
associated with less coupling, and being certiﬁed to management system standards and
having workers’ unions to be associated with more coupling. We also argue that these efﬁciency and managerial structures will moderate each other’s relationship to coupling, and
that certiﬁcation and unions will each increase the other’s positive association with coupling.
Using social audit data on 3,276 suppliers in 55 countries, we ﬁnd evidence that supports our
hypotheses. Our focus on the internal structural composition of suppliers extends the decoupling
literature by theorizing and demonstrating conditions under which suppliers’ core organizational functions are likely to be buffered from change by legitimacy structures. Furthermore, our
ﬁndings suggest important strategic considerations for managers selecting supplier factories
and provide key insights for the design of transnational sustainability governance regimes.
Funding: Financial support came from the Division of Research and Faculty Development, Harvard

Business School.
Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1261.
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from multinational buyers that are, themselves, subject
to myriad institutional pressures to raise labor standards in their supply chains (Okhmatovskiy and David
2011, Distelhorst et al. 2016). High-proﬁle catastrophes
like the Rana Plaza building collapse that killed more
than 1,000 factory workers in Bangladesh have attracted
worldwide attention to hazardous supply chain working conditions, spawning private political activism and
increasing reputational pressure on global brands to
improve them (Bartley and Child 2014). Shareholder
resolutions demanding supply chain due diligence and
observance of international human rights norms are
commanding higher levels of support each proxy season.
Increasingly, MNCs face domestic and international
legal obligations to monitor and report on conditions
in their supply chains and to adhere to the voluntary
commitments they make to improve supply chain working
conditions.
MNCs have responded to these legitimacy pressures,
in large part, by pressuring their suppliers to adopt

Suppliers to global value chains face multiple, intense,
and conﬂicting pressures from their institutional environment. Foremost are the formidable efﬁciency demands
of the global value chain to produce ever more cheaply
and rapidly (Bartley 2005, Gerefﬁ 2005). The productcost economics of global production have pushed lowvalue-added segments of generic services and volume
production to suppliers in the Global South, which
compete principally on labor costs and operate with very
low margins (Gerefﬁ and Christian 2009). Global buyers’
demanding sourcing practices magnify these efﬁciency
pressures (Anner et al. 2013, Locke 2013). Meeting efﬁciency demands is the core organizational imperative of
global suppliers, and they structure their organizations
accordingly, resulting in a “race to the bottom” in labor
practices (Bartley 2005, Gerefﬁ 2005), commonly resulting in sweatshop conditions (Anner et al. 2013).
Suppliers also face increasingly forceful and potentially contradictory legitimacy demands to improve
workplace conditions. These demands come primarily
1
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organizational structures, policies, and procedures to
improve working conditions. The most common of
these are labor codes of conduct and monitoring programs. Codes of conduct are contractual provisions
drafted by buyers that set forth standards governing
working conditions like wages, hours, child labor,
discrimination, and occupational health and safety
(Locke 2013). Codes typically are based on the core labor
standards articulated by the International Labor Organization, and buyers require suppliers to agree to adhere to them as a condition of doing business. Monitoring
programs deploy private social auditors to inspect suppliers and assess their adherence to codes of conduct.
Social auditing of suppliers is pervasive, with hundreds
of thousands of audits conducted on behalf of individual
ﬁrms and multi-stakeholder initiatives each year (Gould
2005), driving an $80 billion social auditing industry
(AFL-CIO 2013).
Although suppliers adopt buyers’ codes of conduct
as a condition of doing business, codes are unlike core
contractual terms like price, quantity, and quality in that
codes seek to satisfy institutional legitimacy demands
rather than to promote transactional efﬁciency. Brands
impose codes to protect their reputations and preserve
their legitimacy, not to improve productive efﬁciency
(Lamin and Zaheer 2012, Locke 2013). While brands seek
the reputational cover that codes provide, their behavior
betrays ambivalence about whether they want suppliers
to rigorously implement code provisions. For instance,
although codes of conduct require suppliers to observe
maximum hours limitations, many buyers continue to
make sourcing demands that are nearly impossible to
meet without excessive overtime (Locke 2013). Similarly,
although codes require compliance with minimum wage
standards, brands continue to squeeze suppliers on
margins, eroding their ability to pay minimum wages
(Locke 2013). Perhaps most tellingly, the requirements of
codes of conduct are rarely enforced by the brands that
impose them. While violations of the code constitute
a contractual breach that would justify terminating
the business relationship, buyers rarely exercise this
power (Locke 2013, Bader 2015, Starmanns 2017). As
Locke (2013, p. 32) observed, “It is an open secret that
few brands ever exit factories, even when they are found
not to be in compliance with the codes of conduct and
that most compliance ofﬁcers have less inﬂuence than
their purchasing or sourcing colleagues when deciding
whether to place (or continue) an order with a noncompliant factory.”
Buyer ambivalence about codes of conduct raises the
possibility that suppliers may decouple these formal
policies from their labor practices to meet efﬁciency
demands. Decoupling can occur on two dimensions.
First, legitimacy structures like codes might be decoupled from organizational practices altogether, meaning
that “they are unimplemented or routinely violated”
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(Bromley and Powell 2012, p. 489). This is the traditional
conception of decoupling, in which organizations adopt
structures symbolically to shield their internal practices from outside scrutiny and gain legitimacy with
external stakeholders without disrupting the pursuit of
internal, organizational imperatives (Thompson 1967,
Meyer and Rowan 1977, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
Second, decoupling can occur when legitimacy structures are largely implemented within an organization
despite a lack of a clear integration with that organization’s core goals. Under these circumstances, the organizational core may be internally buffered from inﬂuence
by seemingly incompatible legitimacy structures (Bromley
and Powell 2012). This conception of decoupling has
developed more recently to accommodate the insight
that it is increasingly difﬁcult to completely decouple
policy from practice in highly rationalized institutional
environments, and yet some organizational structures
nonetheless fail to meaningfully impact core organizational activities because they are marginalized internally.
While these two dimensions of decoupling have been
elaborated theoretically, existing empirical studies have
focused largely on the ﬁrst. Many studies address the
coupling and decoupling of organizational structures
and practices, but there is a “general dearth of research
on buffering between internal practices” (Bromley and
Powell 2012, p. 499). We extend this literature by investigating how different conﬁgurations of internal organizational structures are related to the buffering of
legitimacy structures (i.e., labor codes) to protect the
organizational core. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the
internal structural conditions under which suppliers’
labor practices are likely to be more tightly aligned—or
coupled—with the formal commitments they have made
to adhere to labor codes of conduct. Our focus on internal
structural conditions acknowledges that legitimacy
structures like codes of conduct do not exist in a vacuum;
they coexist with an elaborate ecosystem of organizational structures adopted by suppliers to meet the
competing demands of their institutional environments
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; Bromley and Powell 2012).
For instance, many suppliers adopt “efﬁciency structures” in the form of incentives to spur productivity
and meet efﬁciency demands. Suppliers might also
adopt “managerial structures” like certiﬁed management systems to meet market demands for operational
resilience and consistency or institutional demands for
environmental sustainability or observance of human
rights. Institutional pressures have led some suppliers
to institute managerial structures that provide formal
channels for worker participation, such as unions and
joint planning procedures. We investigate the association
between such organizational structures and the extent
to which suppliers couple their labor practices with the
standards contained in codes of conduct. We highlight
that some organizational structures can act as a buffer—a
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protective barrier that shields core production activities
from potentially threatening changes by legitimacy
structures—while other organizational structures are
associated with less buffering and thus tighter coupling
of legitimacy structures and organizational practices.
We examine these relationships on a proprietary data
set obtained from a large social auditing ﬁrm that contains 8,323 audits of 3,276 suppliers in 55 countries
conducted between 2012 and 2015. All of these suppliers
have adopted labor codes of conduct and are subject to
routine auditing, but they differ in their adoption of other
types of organizational structures to advance efﬁciency
and other managerial goals. We ﬁnd that suppliers with
high-powered incentive structures lag in improving
labor practices and adhering to codes of conduct, suggesting that these structures act as a buffer to protect core
production activities in factories that are highly motivated by efﬁciency imperatives. In contrast, we ﬁnd
tighter coupling of codes and practices at suppliers that
adopt certiﬁed management systems and unions, managerial structures that provide mechanisms for dialogue
across the organization that make it more difﬁcult to
isolate legitimacy structures (such as codes) from production activities (such as labor practices). Furthermore,
we ﬁnd important interactions between these internal structures. On the one hand, we demonstrate that
managerial structures attenuate the negative association between efﬁciency structures and improvement.
On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the converse is also
true: efﬁciency structures attenuate the positive relationship between legitimacy structures and improvement.
Finally, the presence in one supplier of multiple managerial structures—in our study, unions and certiﬁcation—
hastens improvement, suggesting that they are complements and not substitutes.
Our focus on the internal structural composition
of organizations is an important contribution to the
decoupling literature. First, it moves beyond the traditional focus on the coupling effects of external institutional factors. This is a particularly important extension,
because many suppliers operate in institutional environments that lack signiﬁcant pressure to comply with
labor standards (James et al. 2018). We build on a handful
of studies that qualitatively investigate intraorganizational processes of coupling and decoupling (Boiral 2007,
Hallett 2010, Overdevest 2010, Tilcsik 2010, Bartley
and Egels-Zandén 2016). Second, we also extend the
decoupling literature by examining how multiple and
potentially conﬂicting organizational structures are related
to the coupling of legitimacy structures and organizational
practices. Our approach allows us to elaborate the
underdeveloped theoretical concept of internal buffering to encompass the interaction of legitimacy structures and other organizational structures rather than
their mutual isolation. This innovation is crucial to
understanding coupling processes in a world in which

organizations are subject to complex demands that they
often address by adopting multiple and competing formal organizational structures. Third, our investigation
of the organizational incentive structures that operationalize environmental efﬁciency demands is a novel and
important attempt to address the relationship between
legitimacy and efﬁciency imperatives that lies at the
core of the decoupling literature. Conventionally, efﬁciency demands are assumed to be a given condition of
the environment in which business ﬁrms operate. Our
study investigates how these organizations operationalize
efﬁciency demands as incentive structures and how these
structures can act as a buffer protecting the core productive activities of the ﬁrm from legitimacy structures
perceived to threaten them.

Coupling Legitimacy Structures and
Organizational Practices
The existing literature describes two ways that legitimacy
structures can be decoupled from organizational practices. First, legitimacy structures can be adopted symbolically to appease external stakeholders (Thompson
1967, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) while remaining “unimplemented or routinely
violated” (Bromley and Powell 2012, p. 489). In our
context, this would mean that suppliers agree to codeof-conduct requirements requested by buyers but do
not take concrete steps to implement them. The bulk of
theoretical and empirical research on decoupling, particularly those studies focused on legal compliance (Sutton
and Dobbin 1996, Short and Toffel 2010), addresses this
type of “policy–practice” decoupling. Insights from this
literature suggest that legitimacy structures adopted by
suppliers are likely to be decoupled from their practices
for three principal reasons. First, organizational structures adopted in response to legitimacy demands tend
to be implemented symbolically and decoupled from
organizational practices that advance the technical or
efﬁciency-related demands of production work (Meyer
and Rowan 1977, Bromley and Powell 2012). Second,
decoupling is particularly likely in less-elaborated institutional environments, where efﬁciency demands
are strong and institutional pressures to implement legitimacy structures are weak (Meyer and Rowan 1977),
as they are in the emerging economies in which many
suppliers are located. Third, the implementation of
legitimacy-related structures requires organizational
resources that many suppliers operating on extremely
tight margins lack (Bromley and Powell 2012, Lim and
Tsutsui 2012).
Consistent with these general propositions, the bulk
of studies ﬁnding coupling between legitimacy structures and organizational compliance with legitimacy
demands have attributed it to coercive institutional
pressures like state power and civil society political
mobilization (Dobbin and Kelly 2007, Seidman 2007,
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Short and Toffel 2010, Lim and Tsutsui 2012, Toffel et al.
2015). For instance, studies of suppliers’ compliance with
labor standards have focused on the coupling effect of
pressures from the institutional environment, including
consumer pressure (O’Rourke 2003, Gerefﬁ 2005, Vogel
2008, Toffel et al. 2015); pressure from civil society actors
like activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and the press (Seidman 2007, Vogel 2008, Anner 2012,
Anner et al. 2013, Distelhorst et al. 2015, Toffel et al. 2015,
Bartley and Egels-Zandén 2016, James et al. 2018); and
pressures from the state (Bartley 2011, Distelhorst et al.
2015, Toffel et al. 2015, Amengual and Chirot 2016). While
this prevailing theoretical framework contains important and cautionary lessons about the acute threat of
decoupling in less-elaborated institutional environments,
it provides little insight into when coupling is possible
and how it might vary across ﬁrms operating in these
environments.
A second, alternative conception of decoupling has
emerged in the institutional literature based on the
observation that the type of “policy–practice” decoupling described above may not be as rampant as traditionally predicted. Bromley and Powell (2012) argue
that in highly rationalized institutional environments,
legitimacy structures are likely to be at least somewhat
coupled with organizational practices. This is because it
is very difﬁcult to divorce formal policy from on-theground practice completely “in an increasingly managerial world that emphasizes evaluation, standardization, and benchmarking” (Bromley and Powell 2012,
p. 485). In highly rationalized environments, legitimacy
structures are likely to “have real organizational consequences” (Bromley and Powell 2012, p. 496) in the
sense that staff and resources are devoted to their operation. However, those consequences may not extend
to mitigating the harms that prompted the adoption of
the legitimacy structure. Even if environmental rationalization promotes concrete implementation of legitimacy structures, those structures may nonetheless be
prevented from fundamentally changing practices that
are central to the organization’s core mission. The organizational core will be “internally buffered” (Bromley
and Powell 2012), or protected, from the impact of legitimacy structures that are at odds with it. The existing
literature argues that internal buffering is accomplished
by isolating the technical core of the organization from
potentially threatening organizational structures (Binder
2007, Bromley and Powell 2012).
These insights suggest that codes of conduct will
be implemented to some degree rather than entirely
decoupled from supplier practices, because global value
chains are highly rationalized institutional environments. Organizations comprising global value chains
furnish rules of conduct and continuously monitor compliance through routine monitoring by buyers and social auditors. Organizations in the global institutional
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environment, including NGOs, activists, governments,
and intergovernmental organizations, likewise have embraced managerial tools like codes and monitoring to
improve labor conditions in global supply chains (Utting
2005, Nolan 2014, LeBaron and Lister 2015). This is precisely the type of hyper-rationalized environment in which
complete decoupling of policy from practice may be untenable. In fact, numerous studies document that audited
factories tend to improve compliance with labor standards
on average over time as measured by audit scores (Locke
et al. 2007, Shea et al. 2010, Nadvi et al. 2011, Ang et al.
2012, Locke et al. 2013, Toffel et al. 2015).
Yet, codes may nonetheless fail to improve supplier
labor practices if they are internally buffered by other
organizational structures to protect core productive
activities. Neither existing research on decoupling nor
the rationalization thesis explain why some suppliers
improve more than others under similar institutional
conditions. This suggests the need to investigate the internal composition of supplier organizations to identify
structural conditions under which supplier labor practices
are internally buffered from the potentially threatening
changes demanded by codes of conduct. Speciﬁcally, we
investigate the extent to which core production activities
like labor practices are internally buffered from improvement in labor practices to better adhere to labor
codes under different constellations of internal organizational structures. Further, we challenge the prevailing
view in the literature of buffering as the isolation of some
organizational structures from others and investigate
interactions between different structures and their relationship to coupling outcomes. In so doing, our study
provides critical empirical insights and theoretical tools
to explain variation in the coupling of organizational
legitimacy structures in the absence of commonly studied
external pressures such as strong state regulation and
robust civil society.
We deﬁne legitimacy structures as being more tightly
coupled when they are associated with changes in organizational practices that more closely align practices
with institutional demands. In our context, that means
improvement in compliance with codes of labor conduct.
We provide this deﬁnition at the outset, because the
existing literature has been vague in deﬁning coupling.
Many claim to identify coupling or decoupling outcomes
at a static point in time and do not examine relationships
between organizational structure and organizational
change (e.g., Westphal and Zajac 2001, Zajac and Westphal
2004, Lim and Tsutsui 2012). While coupling may mean
different things in different contexts, we contend that
organizational change is the touchstone for identifying
coupling between legitimacy structures and compliance
with normatively based institutional legitimacy demands,
because such demands are typically made to spur improvements in organizational behavior that falls short
of some normative ideal.
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Organizational Structures and the
Coupling of Codes with Practices
Below, we theorize that the degree to which suppliers
couple their labor practices with legitimacy structures
like codes of conduct is related to the presence of other
structures in these organizations. Speciﬁcally, we consider one efﬁciency-driving structure (high-powered
productivity incentives) and two managerial structures (certiﬁed management systems and unions). We
argue that codes will be less tightly coupled with labor
practices when they compete with high-powered productivity incentive structures; in such a circumstance,
these efﬁciency structures will act as a buffer between
core production activities and the intrusive changes
code adherence would require. Such buffering will inhibit the improvement of labor practices to adhere to
labor codes. Conversely, codes and practices will be
more tightly coupled, and buffering will be less pronounced, in suppliers with managerial structures oriented toward improving organizational processes and
fostering dialogue across the organization (that is, certiﬁed management systems and unions), because the
presence of such managerial structures makes it more
difﬁcult to isolate legitimacy structures (such as codes)
from production activities (such as labor practices). We
also investigate how the interaction between managerial
structures and efﬁciency structures relates to the coupling of codes and labor practices. We argue that, on one
hand, managerial structures that can help organizations
reconcile legitimacy and efﬁciency imperatives will attenuate the negative relationship between efﬁciency
structures and code and practice coupling. On the other
hand, efﬁciency structures attenuate the positive relationship between managerial structures and coupling.
Finally, we hypothesize that the two managerial structures we study, certiﬁed management systems and unions,
complement one another by providing, respectively,
diverse channels for cross-organizational communications

and inputs from multiple parties in that dialogue. We
illustrate our theoretical framework in Figure 1.
While we hypothesize associations between (and
among) various internal organizational structures and
the extent to which legitimacy structures will be coupled
with organizational practices, we do not make any
claims about the causal mechanisms driving these relationships. For example, internal organizational structures such as the managerial structures we examine
might provide mechanisms that drive changes in organizational practices, or organizations might be more
likely to adopt such structures if they already have the
will and capacity to achieve the changes sought by external stakeholders. Our data do not allow us to discern
with conﬁdence whether such structures are signals
or mechanisms of organizational improvement. It is
an important ﬁrst step to identify organizational structural conditions under which code compliance is likely
to improve, regardless of the causal mechanisms, because
these conditions provide a useful set of decision heuristics
for reputation-conscious brand managers selecting which
suppliers to work with and for regulators and activists
selecting which suppliers to target for monitoring and
enforcement.
Efﬁciency Structures and Code Coupling
The economics of outsourced transactions create a buyerdriven global supply chain characterized by razor-thin
pricing margins and buyers’ volatile and time-sensitive
ordering practices (Gerefﬁ 2005). These efﬁciency imperatives exist not only in suppliers’ institutional environments; they are also baked into the organizational
structure of many suppliers in the form of productivity
incentives. In response to the global value chain’s intense
efﬁciency demands, some suppliers adopt incentive
structures, ranging from cash bonuses to gift prizes, to
promote low-cost, high-volume production (Bartley 2005,
Gerefﬁ 2005, Anner et al. 2013, Locke et al. 2013). Some

Figure 1. The Role of Internal Structural Conditions in the Coupling of Labor Codes and Practices
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rely on high-powered incentives like piece-rate (or piecework) payment, compensating workers for each unit
produced. This incentive structure aims to align workers’
incentives with the employer’s by giving workers a direct,
ﬁnancial beneﬁt for each incremental improvement in
productivity (Williamson 1985, Lazear 2000).
When multiple organizational structures reﬂecting
different logics coexist within an organization, the structure closest to the organization’s core tasks and operations
is likely to dominate other structures, potentially undermining the aims of the more peripheral structures
(Thornton et al. 2012, Besharov and Smith 2014). In the
supply chain context, labor codes of conduct are likely
to be seen not merely as peripheral, but as potentially incompatible with core organizational productivity imperatives and production activities. The core
imperative of suppliers to global value chains is efﬁcient
production. Traditionally, suppliers try to meet efﬁciency demands by cutting labor costs, but policies like
codes of conduct that demand adherence to speciﬁed labor standards directly threaten this source of
competitive advantage. Core production activities are
therefore likely to be buffered from codes of conduct
that demand changes in labor practices.
High-powered productivity incentives act as a buffer
against such changes by structuring the actions of both
managers and workers in ways that are likely to protect
labor productivity at the expense of improved labor
practices. Suppliers that use high-powered productivity
incentives tend to be particularly devoted to meeting
high, short-term productivity goals (Holmstrom and
Milgrom 1991, Prendergast 1999, Dohmen and Falk
2011) and are therefore likely to focus on maintaining
or enhancing worker productivity rather than on mitigating the negative social effects of production on
workers. Speciﬁcally, managers at piece-rate suppliers
are unlikely to invest substantial resources to improve
labor practices if these investments conﬂict with shortterm productivity goals. In addition, workers at piecerate suppliers may be more reluctant to adopt operational practices that would improve compliance with
labor standards but reduce productivity. For instance,
some health and safety procedures—such as wearing
personal protection equipment (e.g., masks and steelmesh gloves), participating in emergency training, and
using machine guards—can slow the pace of work.
Ethnographic research on logging workers shows that
piece-rate workers refuse to accept the small but certain
economic loss caused by adhering to health and safety
procedures but will accept what they perceive as the low
probability of being injured on the job, even though that
could trigger substantial income loss (Patterson 2007).
Research also shows that piece-rate workers are more
reluctant to take breaks (Lilley et al. 2002), which may
make them more susceptible to mistakes and injuries,
and may, in itself, violate some labor codes of conduct.
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Just as incentives to cut corners to produce more quickly
are associated with inferior labor practices, they are
also likely to hinder workers’ engagement in practices
that would improve those conditions. We therefore
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1. Labor codes of conduct will be less tightly
coupled to labor practices in suppliers with high-powered
productivity incentive structures than in other suppliers.

Managerial Structures and Code Coupling
Although efﬁciency structures are likely to act as a buffer
between labor codes of conduct and improvements in
labor practices, the presence of other types of managerial
structure might strengthen that relationship or might
signal that the supplier has reasonably tightly coupled
its practices to codes. Speciﬁcally, we posit that there
will be less internal buffering (and more coupling) of
legitimacy structures in organizations with managerial
structures that bridge the gap between production
activities and other organizational activities perceived
to threaten them. Below, we examine two of the most
commonly advocated and adopted managerial structures in the global supply chain: certiﬁcation to management systems and unions. We focus on the practices
associated with these structures; speciﬁcally, suppliers’
development of organizational processes designed to
facilitate intraorganizational dialogue.
Certiﬁed Management Systems. A management sys-

tem is “the way in which an organization manages the
inter-related parts of its business in order to achieve its
objectives.”1 Many standard-setting organizations supply
standards to help ﬁrms develop management systems
to achieve particular objectives such as quality control
(e.g., ISO 9001), environmental management (e.g., ISO
14001), food safety (e.g., HACCP), and labor standards
management (e.g., SA8000, ISO 26000). Firms that implement a management system standard can seek certiﬁcation from a third-party auditor attesting that they
adhere. Studies have reached conﬂicting conclusions
about the credibility of certiﬁcation as a signal of superior practices (e.g., Vinodkumar and Bhasi 2011) and
the efﬁcacy of management systems in improving labor
practices (e.g., Seidman 2007, Lo et al. 2014).
We investigate a different question: whether certiﬁed
management systems are associated with tighter coupling between labor codes of conduct and supplier labor
practices. We argue that they will be, because they foster
the development of organizational processes that promote dialogue across different units of the organization,
making it more difﬁcult to isolate organizational activities
from one another. As such, they can mitigate the buffering
of legitimacy structures to protect efﬁciency imperatives.
Intraorganizational communication processes focusing
on internal audits, review meetings, and implementation
of corrective actions involving multiple units are at the
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heart of most certiﬁed management system standards.
For instance, a leading standard focused on process quality
requires ﬁrms to “continually improve . . . through the use
of . . . audit results, analysis of data, corrective and preventive action and management review” (International
Organization for Standardization 2000, p. 13). Similarly,
a leading standard focusing on labor practices in global
supply chains requires companies to “conduct routine
internal audits,” “hold periodic meetings to review
progress and identify potential actions to strengthen
implementation,” and ensure that “corrective and preventive actions . . . are effectively implemented” (Social
Accountability International 2016, p. 126).
These procedures require dynamic input from multiple units, connecting organizational actors from top
management to frontline production, logistics, and backofﬁce operations. Facilitating communication across
different units of the organization has the potential
to mitigate internal buffering of certain structures by
making it more difﬁcult to isolate organizational activities from one another. For example, internal audits and
review meetings led by management can reveal ﬂawed
core production processes, such as the inappropriate
labeling and storage of hazardous chemicals or semiﬁnished products. The implementation of corrective
actions such as the institution of proper procedures
and employee training to label and store goods involves multiple units including frontline production,
logistics, and human resources. These processes thus
enhance interunit dialogues, which can reduce the isolation of core production procedures from labor codes
of conduct and mitigate workplace injury risks. Thus,
we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2a. Labor codes of conduct will be more tightly

coupled to labor practices in suppliers certiﬁed to management system standards than in noncertiﬁed suppliers.
Worker Participation Structures. Contemporary West-

ern management theories emphasize the signiﬁcance
of participatory management and employee empowerment in managing large bureaucratic organizations
(Drucker 1974, Wagner 1994, Collins 1997). Distinct
from traditional top-down management approaches,
participatory management aims to balance the involvement of managers and workers in decision making or
problem solving. Instituting worker participation channels such as communication platforms and employee
hotlines has become a hallmark of rationalized Western
management best practices (Drucker 1974, Wagner 1994,
Collins 1997).
Leading multinational brands increasingly require
suppliers to deploy participatory management practices
to promote manager–worker dialogue, from joint planning
procedures to unions. Target states in its supplier code of
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corporate responsibility that it “expects suppliers to productively engage workers and value them as critical
assets to sustainable business success. This includes respecting the rights of workers to freely associate, engage in
worker participation groups and submit individual
grievances without fear of retaliation” (Target 2018).
Reebok (now a part of Adidas) required its suppliers
to develop worker empowerment programs that train
workers on their legal rights, provide channels for communication with both management and factory monitors
about concerns, and foster collective worker representation (Yu 2009).
Among these worker participation practices, unions
have been the most important formal channel for worker
participation in management processes. To date, scholars,
particularly those studying the Americas and the European Union, have focused on unions’ political role in
rectifying power imbalances between workers and
employers (Reilly et al. 1995, Rodriguez-Garavito 2005,
Morantz 2009). However, unions play a different role
in many of the developing countries where supply
chain factories are located. First, workers in many such
countries are routinely denied bottom-up representation of their choosing (Anner 2012, Anner and Liu 2016,
Bartley and Egels-Zandén 2016). Second, employers
that permit unions often do so merely to curry political
favor with the authoritarian state rather than to give
workers any meaningful voice (Brown and O’Rourke
2007, Friedman and Lee 2010). In countries such as China
and Vietnam, unions are considered extensions of the
government rather than independent representatives
of workers’ interests (Anner and Liu 2016), raising serious
questions about whether they will be associated with
improvements in labor standards.
Yet, by focusing on the relative political impotence of
unions in certain environments, these accounts have
neglected other important managerial functions unions
can play in suppliers. In fact, unions can play an effective
communication role that facilitates dialogue between
managers and workers and enables workers to help
improve production processes and rectify issues. First,
unions can provide an additional communication channel for workers to bring hazards to management’s
attention, one that is often safer and more effective
than doing so directly. Many workplace hazards would
not be known to managers absent communication with
affected workers. For example, in some Chinese factories,
unions have input on monitoring occupational health
and safety conditions by having a union member serve
as a labor protection investigator on the shop ﬂoor (Chen
and Chan 2004). Such practices facilitate employee reports of health and safety concerns. Research has also
found that unions put forth proposals to remedy unsafe
and hazardous conditions (Chen and Chan 2004) and
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cooperate directly with management to monitor and
correct those conditions (Reilly et al. 1995, Walters 2006).
Second, in many factories, unions provide a vehicle for
communicating information about occupational health
and safety to workers. Indeed, research has shown that in
unionized factories, workers are more aware of dangerous practices (Gillen et al. 2002). In China, studies
have found that unions are often tasked with educating
employees on workplace conditions and workers’ wellbeing, which can help train frontline workers to identify
and to protect themselves from occupational hazards
(Dong et al. 2004, Nissen et al. 2008). By engaging and
educating workers, unions can assist in improving production processes and in identifying and rectifying
workplace issues, thus improving labor practices. For
these reasons, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2b. Labor codes of conduct will be more tightly

coupled to labor practices in suppliers with workers’ unions than
in suppliers without workers’ unions.
Interactions Among Efﬁciency and
Managerial Structures
The existing literature suggests that internally buffered
structures will be isolated from the technical core of
the organization (Bromley and Powell 2012) or from
one another (Binder 2007). This claim is in some tension
with research on institutional complexity and institutional scholarship demonstrating that organizational
structures can be mutually constituting. Studies have
demonstrated, for instance, that organizational structures based on very different logics can coexist within
organizations and, under certain conditions, can become
intertwined (Besharov and Smith 2014). Neoinstitutional
scholars have similarly demonstrated that organizational conceptions of efﬁciency and compliance with
legal norms can shape one another (Dobbin and Sutton
1998). Thus, particularly in organizations with managerial structures that emphasize improving organizational processes and fostering interunit dialogue, one
would expect mutual inﬂuence among organizational
structures rather than isolation. We hypothesize above
that efﬁciency structures will buffer the internal impact
of legitimacy structures like codes of conduct that seek
to change labor practices in ways that could undermine
productivity and conversely that managerial structures
like certiﬁcation and unions will be associated with
tighter coupling of codes and labor practices. But what
is the relationship of efﬁciency and managerial structures to one another? And how does their interaction
relate to such coupling?
Managerial Structures Mitigate Buffering by Efﬁciency
Structures. We argue that managerial structures will

attenuate the negative relationship between efﬁciency
structures and the coupling of labor codes and practices.
Research suggests that multiple organizational structures
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reﬂecting different logics can become compatible with
each other, especially when they are aligned in realizing
organizational goals (e.g., Binder 2007, Besharov and
Smith 2014). In our context, the looser coupling between labor practices and labor codes associated with
efﬁciency structures is particularly likely to be tempered
when a process improvement approach and intraorganizational dialogue fostered by managerial structures can help the organization reconcile legitimacy
and efﬁciency demands. Speciﬁcally, we posit that both
certiﬁcation and unions can help alleviate the perceived
conﬂict between codes of conduct and production
efﬁciency, especially in the presence of structures that
emphasize such efﬁciency.
As discussed previously, the pursuit of high-volume
production and short-term economic rewards under
high-powered productivity incentives can discourage
practices that would improve labor practices at some
cost to productivity. However, certiﬁcation to management system standards can help suppliers develop
and sustain production practices that ultimately improve productivity and reduce the marginal costs of
compliance, which, in turn, can improve labor practices.
For example, adopting quality management systems
may improve production planning and reduce cycle
time (Dunlop and Weil 1996, Appelbaum 2000), which,
in turn, may reduce the pressure on workers to work
overtime (Locke et al. 2009). Thus, by improving production process management, suppliers may reduce the
cost of remediating certain violations of workplace standards. Furthermore, the management process improvements associated with lean production have been shown
to increase productivity and quality (Holweg 2007) while
also reducing noncompliance with supplier codes of
conduct (Distelhorst et al. 2016). Such production practices can alleviate the underlying tension between shortterm economic rewards and labor code compliance in
high-productivity-oriented contexts.
We posit that unions, too, can attenuate the negative
relationship between high-powered productivity incentives and the coupling of labor codes of conduct and
labor practices. First, unions often educate workers on
occupational hazards, the costs they would bear from
workplace injuries, and their legal rights (Meng and
Smith 1993, Morse et al. 2003), which can countervail the
incentive to cut corners in pursuit of rapid production.
Second, unions are associated with longer job tenure
(Freeman 1980, Bender and Sloane 1999), which increases
the chance that managers will invest in worker training
and other programs that improve both labor practices
and productivity, but only over the long term. Workers
similarly may be more likely to support such practices
if they expect to be around long enough to beneﬁt from
them, which can, in turn, increase the likelihood that
managers will invest in them. In addition, in domestic
contexts where many suppliers in our sample are
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located, unions are used as a vehicle for reconciling social
goals with business interests (Zajak 2017). Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3a. Being certiﬁed to management system standards attenuates the looser coupling of labor codes of conduct
and labor practices associated with high-powered productivity
incentive structures.
Hypothesis 3b. Workers’ unions attenuate the looser cou-

pling of labor codes of conduct and labor practices associated
with high-powered productivity incentive structures.
Efﬁciency Structures Temper Coupling by Managerial
Structures. We hypothesized above that managerial

structures can mitigate the looser coupling of labor codes
and practices that we observe when efﬁciency structures
act as a buffer. Here, we posit the inverse relationship,
that efﬁciency structures can temper the positive association between managerial structures and the coupling
of labor codes and labor practices. Existing literature
suggests that when multiple organizational structures
reﬂecting different logics coexist within an organization,
the structure that is core to the organizational tasks and
operations is likely to dominate, diminishing or marginalizing other structures (Thornton et al. 2012, Besharov
and Smith 2014). In the global value chain context, as
we argued above, efﬁciency demands are paramount.
In suppliers that maintain high-powered productivity
incentives, labor productivity is prioritized at the expense
of improved labor practices. For example, managers
at piece-rate suppliers are less likely to take workers off
the line to engage in comprehensive training that would
teach continuous improvement techniques (e.g., to
identify hazards and learn safer work procedures) or
internal assessment and review meetings that would
foster interunit dialogue. Similarly, workers at such
suppliers might be more reluctant to provide input
and engage in communication that might even temporarily impede productivity. Thus, we posit that efﬁciency
structures like piece-rate payment incentives will attenuate the positive relationship between managerial
structures like certiﬁcation and unions and code compliance improvement.
Hypothesis 3c. High-powered productivity incentive struc-

tures attenuate the tighter coupling of labor codes of conduct
and labor practices associated with being certiﬁed to management system standards.
Hypothesis 3d. High-powered productivity incentive struc-

tures attenuate the tighter coupling of labor codes of conduct
and labor practices associated with being unionized.
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are supported by workers who can provide information,
monitoring, and advocacy (Rodriguez-Garavito 2005,
Anner et al. 2013)—that is, that the relationship is complementary. Yet, another strand of research suggests that
the relationship is substitutive by arguing that certiﬁed
management systems are designed to displace union
interventions (Esbenshade 2004, Bartley 2005) or to
substitute for ineffective unions (Locke et al. 2013). In
the context of global supply chain factories, we argue
that unions and certiﬁed management systems are complementary in their association with tighter coupling
between labor codes and labor practices because together
they provide more comprehensive communication channels and richer input across the organization.
On the one hand, certiﬁed management systems tend
to focus on developing communication channels across
formal organizational units or departments. As argued
previously, certiﬁed management systems can engage
multiple units and management teams in ongoing internal assessments, continuous improvement efforts, and
corrective action procedures. These activities provide
formal channels for workers’ unions to bring workplace
hazards to management’s attention in a systematic
manner, magnifying their efforts to broadcast these
concerns to multiple units across the organization, and
enhancing workers’ unions’ communication role. In
addition, these internal assessment and review meetings
can also convey integrated messages from multiple units
to workers’ unions, which can then deliver more comprehensive information and useful training to workers.
On the other hand, unions tend to focus on fostering
communication channels across organizational constituencies (rather than units) and enriching the content of
communication by cultivating input from workers. For
instance, unions can collect from frontline workers information related to issue identiﬁcation, risk assessment,
and procedure updates, which in turn can improve the
implementation of management systems. In addition, the
union’s educational and communicative roles can raise
workers’ awareness of management system standards and
engagement in certain certiﬁcation programs (O’Rourke
2003, Rodriguez-Garavito 2005, Yu 2009), enhancing the
usefulness of worker input about the implementation
of these programs. Because the value of each of these
managerial structures depends, jointly, on both the availability of communication channels and the quality of
dialogue ﬂowing through them, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 4a. Being certiﬁed to management system stan-

dards enhances the coupling of labor codes of conduct and labor
practices associated with being unionized.

Managerial Structures Complement Each Other. Prior

Hypothesis 4b. Workers’ unions enhance the coupling of

scholarship has argued that management systems to
protect workers are more likely to succeed when they

labor codes of conduct and labor practices associated with
being certiﬁed to management system standards.
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Data and Measures
We test our hypotheses using a proprietary data set from
a large social auditing ﬁrm that required anonymity as
a condition of sharing its data. The Europe-based multinational ﬁrm has tens of thousands of employees based
in hundreds of ofﬁces around the world. It is a wellrecognized inspection and product testing agency, is
accredited to conduct certiﬁcation assessments of several
leading codes of conduct standards in the industry, and
also conducts social auditing assessments of its clients’
proprietary supplier codes of conduct. The data set includes all audits against a single code of conduct that the
ﬁrm conducted from 2012 through 2015. The time gap
between suppliers’ successive audits averaged 9 months
and ranged from 2.4 months to 14.5 months.2 The data
set also provides characteristics (but not the names) of
each audited supplier,3 the audit team, and the buyer on
whose behalf the audit was conducted.
Because our empirical speciﬁcation includes a supplier’s focal (current) audit and its prior audit, our estimation sample is limited to those suppliers with at least
two audits in our data set. For our primary analysis, we
omit 769 suppliers (about 17% of the full data set) that
report information about the presence of a workers’
union, piece-rate payment, or certiﬁcation that is inconsistent between the prior and focal audits because of
concerns about potential endogeneity associated with
their adoption during our sample period. Doing so results in our hypothesized variables in our primary
analysis being identiﬁed based on differences between
(not within) suppliers, an approach suitable for our
correlational analysis.4 Our estimations are based on
4,887 focal audits of 3,276 suppliers in 55 countries on
behalf of 102 buyers from 11 countries. Because our
speciﬁcation also relies on data from each supplier’s
prior audit, our analysis is based on a total of 8,323 focal
and prior audits.5 Table A1 of Online Appendix A reports the industry composition of our sample: the most
common industries are hardlines (merchandise such as
furniture, household utensils, and home décor), apparel,
and electronics. As Table A2 of Online Appendix A
shows, most of the audited suppliers are in China; the
rest are elsewhere in Asia, Europe, and the Americas.
Dependent Variable
In our context, audit teams assess the extent to which
suppliers’ workplace conditions meet a single code of
conduct that speciﬁes maximum working hours and
minimum wages, occupational health and safety practices, and environmental management practices. This
standard is highly consistent with international consensus standards such as the International Labour
Organization (ILO) core labor standards.6 During the
audit, auditors review documentation, interview employees who are randomly selected by auditors, and
conduct onsite inspections to assess the actual state of
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affairs on the shop ﬂoor. Each audit results in a labor
practice score, a summary score of all aforementioned
code of conduct categories, that ranges from 0 to 100,
with higher scores indicating that labor practices better
adhere to the code and thus tighter coupling. In our
sample, scores range from 19 to 100, the average being 79.
Our dependent variable measures a supplier’s labor
practice improvement between its prior and focal audits,
calculated by subtracting the prior audit’s labor practices score from the focal audit’s score. Larger values
indicate greater improvement and thus an increase in
coupling between labor practices and labor codes of
conduct. In our sample, improvement averages 6 and
ranges from –62 to 67.7
Independent Variables
We identify factories that use high-powered productivity
incentives by coding piece-rate payment, a dichotomous
variable, as 1 when the supplier pays its frontline workers
on a piece rate, and 0 otherwise.8 We code certiﬁcation to
a management system standard as 1 when a supplier is
certiﬁed to at least one standard—such as SA8000,
WRAP, ISO 9001, or OHSAS 18001—at the time it is
audited,9 and 0 otherwise. Workers’ union, another dichotomous variable, equals 1 when the supplier is
unionized, as recorded by the auditor, and 0 otherwise.
Data for these three variables were obtained from the
audit database. In our model, we use lagged values so
that they pertain to the supplier’s prior audit to examine
their effect on subsequent improvement. Fifteen percent
of these prior audits were conducted at certiﬁed suppliers,10 26% at unionized suppliers, and 11% at suppliers
that use piece-rate payment.
Control Variables
Audit Level. We control for several audit-level factors
that might inﬂuence the extent to which suppliers improve labor practices. We include labor practice score
(prior audit) because suppliers with lower prior scores
have more room for improvement—and might face less
expensive improvement opportunities—than those that
already had superior labor practices. We also control for
audit sequence with a series of dummies denoting the
supplier’s ﬁrst audit in the sample, the second, and so
on, because suppliers may face increasing remediation
costs and difﬁculties in subsequent audits. Whether the
supplier is paying for the audit can also inﬂuence auditors’ reports because of the conﬂict of interest that
might lead auditors to report fewer violations when the
audit is paid for by the supplier rather than the buyer
(Short et al. 2016). We therefore create two dummy
variables, paid by buyer (prior audit) and paid by buyer
(focal audit), to distinguish those audits from those paid
for by the supplier itself.
We control for several characteristics of audit teams
that prior research has shown can affect audit scores
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(Short et al. 2016). First, we create dummy variables to
control for the gender composition of the audit teams
that conducted the supplier’s prior and focal audits: allfemale audit team and mixed-gender audit team, with allmale audit team as the omitted category. Second, we
control for audit team average age for the prior and focal
audits, based on auditor age data provided by the
auditing ﬁrm. Third, we control for audit team maximum
tenure—the most years that any member of the audit
team had worked at the auditing ﬁrm—for the prior
and focal audits.11
Supplier Level. We control for supplier size because

larger factories, being more visible, are exposed to
higher regulatory pressures (Surroca et al. 2013), which
could increase their willingness to improve. We measure
supplier size as the number of employees, obtained from
the auditing company, which we log to reduce skew. We
also control for supplier age by adding 1 to the difference
between the audit year and the factory’s founding year.
We top-code the values at the 99th percentile of the
sample distribution (68) to reduce the potential impact
of outliers, then use the log to reduce skew.
We control for several other factors that might inﬂuence a supplier’s improvement rate. Migrant workers
are more likely to be exploited and mistreated while
local workers tend to demand better working conditions
(Flanagan 2006). Managers in factories with a higher
proportion of local workers (compared with migrant
workers) might therefore face more pressure to improve
labor practices. In contrast, some factories might invest
in improving labor practices to better attract migrant
workers. These competing concerns lead us to control
for local worker ratio in the supplier factory, operationalized as the percentage of frontline employees who are
local, based on audit data. Gender differences in the
workforce might also inﬂuence improvement rates.
Some studies suggest that female workers in laborintensive industries are docile and complain less (e.g.,
Caraway 2007), which implies that workplaces with
a greater proportion of female employees might improve less because there will be less pressure to remedy
harmful conditions. However, other studies argue that
female employees resist exploitive workplace conditions
and actively exercise their rights (e.g., Rock 2003, Elias
2005), which implies that workplaces with a greater
proportion of female employees might improve more.
The possibility that the gender composition of the
workforce might inﬂuence improvement rates in one
direction or the other leads us to control for female worker
ratio in the supplier factory, operationalized as the percentage of frontline employees who are women. Furthermore, some factories outsource part of their production to
subcontractors to evade health and safety requirements
(O’Rourke 2003). Because factories that subcontract
might improve more if they outsource problems, we

include a dummy variable use subcontractors, which we
code based on audit data.

Estimation and Results
The aforementioned independent variables and control
variables can inﬂuence labor practice scores in both the
prior and focal audits. Therefore, to predict improvement, we need to account for these factors for both
audits. We include audit team characteristics—gender
composition, average age, and maximum tenure—for
both.12 However, because the supplier-level variables
are very stable, including them for both audits would
substantially increase multicollinearity without adding
meaningful controls.13 Therefore, we include them only
for the prior audit.
We include industry and year ﬁxed effects to control
for potential differences in improvement rate between
suppliers in different industries and between various
years in our sample. Because research shows that governmental, economic, and civil society attributes of buyers’
headquarters country can inﬂuence their attentiveness
to supply chain conditions, which can in turn affect the
pressure they exert on suppliers to comply to labor standards (Toffel et al. 2015), we construct dummy variables
for each buyer’s headquarters country.14
Results
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1; descriptive
statistics and correlations are reported in Tables A1–A3
of Online Appendix A. We test our hypotheses using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, clustering standard errors by the supplier’s country (a more conservative
approach than clustering by supplier), and report results
in Table 2.15 Model 1 tests our direct-effect hypotheses
(Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b). The statistically signiﬁcant
negative coefﬁcient on piece-rate payment (prior audit) (β =
–3.59, p < 0.01) reveals that factories paying workers on
a piece-rate basis improve less on average than other
factories, which supports Hypothesis 1. Predictive margins indicate that suppliers that used piece-rate payment improved their audit score in successive audits
by 3.0 points on average, less than half the 6.6-point
average improvement among suppliers that did not use
piece-rate payment.
The statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on
certiﬁcation (prior audit) (β = 0.98, p < 0.01) indicates
that suppliers certiﬁed to management system standards improve more than noncertiﬁed suppliers, which
supports Hypothesis 2a. Predictive margins indicate
that certiﬁed suppliers improved by an average of 7.0
points, 17% more than the 6.0-point average improvement of noncertiﬁed suppliers.
The statistically signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on
workers’ union (prior audit) (β = 1.18, p < 0.01) indicates that
unionized suppliers improve more than nonunionized
suppliers, which supports Hypothesis 2b. Predictive
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Table 1. Summary Statistics

Labor practice score (focal audit)
Improvement
Piece-rate payment (prior audit)
Certiﬁcation (prior audit)
Workers’ union (prior audit)
Labor practice score (prior audit)
Paid by buyer (prior audit)
Paid by buyer (focal audit)
All-female team (prior audit)
All-female team (focal audit)
Mixed-gender team (prior audit)
Mixed-gender team (focal audit)
Audit team average age (prior audit)
Audit team average age (focal audit)
Audit team maximum tenure (prior audit)
Audit team maximum tenure (focal audit)
Audit sequence
Supplier’s size (prior audit)L
Supplier’s age (prior audit)L
Female worker ratio (prior audit)
Local worker ratio (prior audit)
Use subcontractors (prior audit)

Mean

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

78.83
6.19
0.11
0.15
0.26
72.65
0.33
0.33
0.34
0.36
0.14
0.12
30.80
31.03
3.82
4.00
2.73
5.21
2.22
0.57
0.49
0.19

16.19
16.53
0.31
0.36
0.44
17.33
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.48
0.35
0.32
4.89
5.04
2.70
2.75
1.01
1.30
0.74
0.20
0.40
0.39

19.22
−62.42
0
0
0
16.05
0
0
0
0
0
0
24.70
24.50
0.69
0.72
2
1.79
0
0
0
0

100
66.55
1
1
1
100
1
1
1
1
1
1
47
47
10.48
10.48
6
9.62
4.22
1
1
1

Note. N = 4,887.
L
indicates logged.

margins indicate that unionized suppliers improved
by 7.1 points, 20% more than the 5.9-point average improvement of nonunionized suppliers.
We test Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3c with Model 2,
which adds the interaction between piece-rate payment
(prior audit) and certiﬁcation (prior audit). Pairwise comparison of predictive margins reveals that piece-rate
payment factories that are not certiﬁed to management system standards improve by an average of 2.6
points (42% of the 6.2-point sample mean), whereas
piece-rate payment factories that are certiﬁed improve
by an average of 4.7 points (76% of the sample mean),
a statistically signiﬁcantly difference (F = 18.48, p < 0.01).
These results support the prediction of Hypothesis 3a
that certiﬁcation to a management system standard
signiﬁcantly attenuates the negative association between piece-rate payment and the coupling of labor
codes and labor practices. Furthermore, certiﬁed factories that do not use piece-rate payment improve by
an average of 7.2 points (116% of the sample mean),
statistically signiﬁcantly more than the average 4.7point improvement of certiﬁed factories that use piecerate payment (F = 10.39, p < 0.01). These results support
the prediction of Hypothesis 3c that piece-rate payment
signiﬁcantly attenuates the positive association between
certiﬁcation to management system standards and the
coupling of labor codes and labor practices. Figure A1
of Online Appendix A graphs these average predicted
effects along with their 95% conﬁdence intervals.
We test Hypothesis 3b and Hypothesis 3d with Model 3,
which adds to our base model the interaction between

piece-rate payment (prior audit) and workers’ union (prior
audit). Pairwise comparison of predictive margins reveals that nonunionized piece-rate payment factories
improved an average of 2.1 points (34% of the sample
mean), whereas unionized piece-rate payment factories
improved an average of 4.6 points (74% of the sample
mean), a statistically signiﬁcant difference (F = 25.5, p <
0.01). These results, depicted in Figure A2 of Online
Appendix A, support the prediction of Hypothesis 3b
that workers’ unions signiﬁcantly attenuate the negative
association between piece-rate payment and the coupling of labor codes and labor practices. Furthermore,
unionized factories that do not use piece-rate payment
improve an average of 7.3 points (118% of the sample
mean), statistically signiﬁcantly more than the average
4.6-point improvement of unionized piece-rate payment factories (F = 10.22, p < 0.01). These results, also
depicted in Figure A2 of Online Appendix A, support
the prediction of Hypothesis 3d that piece-rate payment
signiﬁcantly attenuate the positive association between
piece-rate payment and the coupling of labor codes and
labor practices.
We test Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b with Model 4,
which adds to our base model the interaction between
certiﬁcation (prior audit) and workers’ union (prior audit).
Pairwise comparison of predictive margins reveals that
certiﬁed unionized factories averaged 9.2-point improvement, whereas noncertiﬁed unionized factories improved
by an average of 6.4 points, a statistically signiﬁcant
difference (F = 23.46; p < 0.01; also see Figure A3 of
Online Appendix A). This supports the prediction of

Bird, Short, and Toffel: Coupling Labor Codes and Supplier Labor Practices

13

Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–21, © 2019 INFORMS

Table 2. Regression Results
Dependent variable: Improvement

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Piece-rate payment (prior audit)

−3.588***
(0.838)

−3.842***
(0.901)

−4.168***
(0.815)

−3.623***
(0.871)

Certiﬁcation (prior audit)

0.977***
(0.196)

0.804**
(0.231)

0.958***
(0.192)

−0.262
(0.379)

Workers’ union (prior audit)

1.177***
(0.127)

1.164***
(0.132)

0.962***
(0.122)

0.527*
(0.249)

Piece-rate payment (prior audit) × Certiﬁcation (prior audit)

1.327*
(0.615)

Piece-rate payment (prior audit) × Workers’ union (prior audit)

1.489**
(0.487)

Certiﬁcation (prior audit) × Workers’ union (prior audit)

3.068**
(0.913)

Labor practice score (prior audit)

−0.603***
(0.006)

−0.603***
(0.006)

−0.603***
(0.006)

−0.603***
(0.006)

Paid by buyer (prior audit)

0.169
(0.299)

0.173
(0.299)

0.153
(0.301)

0.178
(0.292)

Paid by buyer (focal audit)

0.978*
(0.448)

0.974*
(0.449)

0.975*
(0.450)

0.986*
(0.443)

All-female team (prior audit)

−0.138
(0.221)

−0.145
(0.220)

−0.124
(0.221)

−0.170
(0.220)

All-female team (focal audit)

−0.576*
(0.218)

−0.574*
(0.217)

−0.573*
(0.220)

−0.593**
(0.215)

Mixed-gender team (prior audit)

1.656*
(0.697)

1.664*
(0.694)

1.691*
(0.696)

1.708*
(0.700)

Mixed-gender team (focal audit)

−4.302***
(0.748)

−4.300***
(0.745)

−4.302***
(0.742)

−4.266***
(0.734)

Audit team average age (prior audit)

−0.074
(0.050)

−0.074
(0.050)

−0.072
(0.051)

−0.079
(0.052)

Audit team average age (focal audit)

0.114**
(0.038)

0.114**
(0.038)

0.114**
(0.039)

0.112**
(0.038)

Audit team maximum tenure (prior audit)

0.305***
(0.056)

0.306***
(0.056)

0.302***
(0.056)

0.305***
(0.056)

Audit team maximum tenure (focal audit)

−0.307***
(0.066)

−0.306***
(0.066)

−0.308***
(0.065)

−0.310***
(0.065)

Supplier’s size (prior audit)L

0.281*
(0.138)

0.283*
(0.139)

0.285*
(0.138)

0.289†
(0.145)

Supplier’s age (prior audit)L

−0.013
(0.154)

−0.012
(0.155)

−0.001
(0.153)

−0.005
(0.152)

Female worker ratio (prior audit)

3.842***
(0.382)

3.876***
(0.379)

3.825***
(0.378)

3.972***
(0.390)

Local worker ratio (prior audit)

−0.360***
(0.096)

−0.361***
(0.096)

−0.332***
(0.094)

−0.415***
(0.100)

Use subcontractors (prior audit)

0.012
(0.669)

0.002
(0.666)

0.026
(0.670)

0.022
(0.673)

4,887
0.3983

4,887
0.3984

4,887
0.3984

4,887
0.3992

Observations
R2

Notes. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefﬁcients with standard errors clustered by supplier country
in parentheses. Industry ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effects, audit-sequence ﬁxed effects, supplier-country ﬁxed
effects, and buyer-country ﬁxed effects are included.
†
p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
L
indicates logged.

Hypothesis 4a that workers’ unions are associated with
greater coupling of labor codes and labor practices (and
thus greater labor practice improvement) in certiﬁed
suppliers than in not-certiﬁed suppliers. In addition,

the 9.2-point average improvement among certiﬁed
unionized factories is statistically signiﬁcantly more
than the average 5.6-point improvement of certiﬁed
nonunionized factories (F = 23.52; p < 0.01; also see
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Figure A3 of Online Appendix A). This supports the
prediction of Hypothesis 4b that certiﬁcation is associated
with greater coupling of labor codes and labor practices
(and thus greater labor practice improvement) in unionized
suppliers than in nonunionized suppliers.
Turning to our control variables, we ﬁnd strong
evidence that improvement rates signiﬁcantly differ by
industry (see Table B1 of Online Appendix B), year,
audit-sequence, and buyer country (each of four Wald
tests rejects the equality of each set of ﬁxed effects at p <
0.01). Consistent with the notion that high performers
face fewer or more expensive opportunities to improve,
we ﬁnd that factories with higher baseline scores exhibit less improvement, as evidenced by a signiﬁcant
negative coefﬁcient on labor practice score (prior audit).
Regarding audit team characteristics, we ﬁrst examine
the effects of the focal audit team, which are interpreted
as leniency that inﬂuences the current audit score element of improvement. Our results yield negative coefﬁcients on all-female team (focal audit), mixed-gender team
(focal audit), and audit team maximum tenure (focal audit),
suggesting that all-male teams and less-experienced
teams are more lenient, which is consistent with Short
et al. (2016).16 Considering the characteristics of prior
audit teams, we ﬁnd more improvement among factories
whose prior audit teams were more experienced (conﬁrming Hugill et al. 2018) and that were mixed gender.17
Regarding the payment party and noting that paid by
buyer (focal audit) and paid by buyer (prior audit) are highly
correlated (ρ = 0.74, per Table A3), our reestimation
shows that coefﬁcients reported in Table 2 on paid
by buyer (prior audit) and paid by buyer (focal audit) are
driven by multicollinearity and should thus be interpreted with caution.18
Turning to supplier characteristics, signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on supplier’s size (prior audit) suggests that
larger factories improve more. The signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcient on female worker ratio (prior audit) indicates that
factories with a greater proportion of female workers
improve more, which suggests female workers might
be more likely to raise concerns about workplace conditions, consistent with studies on female workers’ resistance to exploitive labor conditions (e.g., Rock 2003,
Elias 2005). The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on local
worker ratio (prior audit) indicates that factories with larger
proportions of migrant workers improve more, which
suggests that factories might be more motivated to
improve labor practices to attract migrant workers than
to attract local workers. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of
the use of subcontractor labor on improvement.
Robustness Tests
Online Appendix C reports further analyses to assess
the robustness of our results. First, we assess whether
controlling for whether an audit is announced or unannounced affects our results, as prior research indicates
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that it can inﬂuence improvement rates (Hugill et al.
2018). We added two dummy control variables, announced
(prior audit) and announced (focal audit), to our primary
models and estimated them on the subsample of
audits (those conducted in 2014 and 2015) for which
our data set includes announcement information (see
Table C1). Second, we assess whether the time gap
between suppliers’ prior and focal audits inﬂuenced
our results by testing our hypotheses on a new dependent
variable, improvement per month (see Table C2). Third,
because more powerful buyers might be more successful
at coercing their suppliers to improve labor practices, we
control for this by including admittedly crude proxies
for buyer power (total number of facilities audited for each
buyer and its square in Table C3 and log in Table C4).
Fourth, all models (including ours) that predict a difference score while controlling for the lagged score assume
there is no contemporaneous correlation between the
lagged score and the error term (that is, between yi,t–1
and εi,t). As a robustness test, we estimate an alternative set of models that predict ln(yi,t/yi,t–1) and
control for ln(yi,t–1) instead of yi,t–1, which assumes no
contemporaneous correlation between the lagged log
score (ln(yi,t–1)) and the error term (εi,t) resulting from
predicting ln(yi,t/yi,t–1) conditional on ln(yi,t–1). All of
these robustness test results support our hypotheses.
Lastly, in our primary analysis, we compare variations
between suppliers using a cross-sectional approach,
and here we test whether our theory holds by examining variations within suppliers with supplier ﬁxedeffects models. The coefﬁcients on the hypothesized
variables in these supplier ﬁxed-effects models are
identiﬁed exclusively by instances in which suppliers
adopted (or dropped) piece-rate payment, certiﬁcation,
and/or unions. As such, these coefﬁcients are generated
by an entirely different set of suppliers from our main
sample. This set of supplier ﬁxed-effects models yields
results that are largely consistent with our main models,
which increases the external validity of our theory.
Supplemental Analysis: Prescriptive vs. Generative
Management Systems
In the above analyses, we treat management system
standards certiﬁcation generically, focusing on the interunit dialogue improvement features common to these
regimes. However, different regimes have different degrees of emphasis on process improvement versus compliance with prescriptive, substantive rules. We conducted
supplemental analyses to investigate whether certiﬁcations
that differ in this regard also differ in their relationship
to the coupling of codes of conduct and supplier labor
practices.
Several of the certiﬁcation programs in our sample
prescribe substantive rules with which suppliers must
comply to obtain certiﬁcation. For example, the Business
Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) management system
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standard includes a code of conduct requiring fair remuneration and observance of speciﬁed occupational
health and safety rules and prohibiting child labor and
forced labor. Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) mandates adherence to 12 “Production
Principles” similarly protecting workers’ rights. These
management systems provide externally imposed prescriptive rules, and suppliers certiﬁed to these systems
are audited primarily to ensure they fully comply with
these substantive rules. We deﬁne these as “prescriptive”
certiﬁcations and code the variable prescriptive certiﬁcation
(prior audit) as 1 when the audited supplier has been
certiﬁed to at least one of them, and 0 otherwise.
In contrast, we deﬁne “generative” certiﬁcations as
those that lack prescriptive rules and instead require the
organization to identify and develop its own objectives
in the production process based on risk assessment
practices and to update these objectives through periodic review. For instance, ISO 9001 places responsibility
on the certiﬁed organization to “establish the objectives
and processes necessary to deliver results” (ISO 90012000: vi), and ISO 14001 stresses that objectives may
differ across organizations (ISO 14001-1996). We code
the variable generative certiﬁcation (prior audit) as 1 when
the audited supplier is certiﬁed to at least one such
system, and 0 otherwise. (Table D1 of Online Appendix D
lists the prescriptive and generative certiﬁcations in our
sample.)
Replacing our single certiﬁcation variable with these
two certiﬁcation variables yields a positive and significant coefﬁcient on generative certiﬁcation (prior audit) and
a nonsigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on prescriptive certiﬁcation
(prior audit). The results, reported as Model 1 of Table D2
(Online Appendix D), indicate that generative certiﬁcation is associated with improvements in supplier labor
practices, but no evidence that prescriptive certiﬁcation
is. We also analyze the relationship between these two
certiﬁcation variables and labor practice levels (that is, the
labor practice scores reported in focal audits) and report
results as Model 2 of Table D2. Both certiﬁcation variables are positively associated with superior labor
practice levels. Yet, as Model 1 shows, only generative
certiﬁcations are associated with improvement. These
ﬁndings offer additional support for our argument that
it is an emphasis on the development of organizational
processes that facilitate cross-organizational dialogue
that explains the positive association between managerial structures and the coupling of codes of conduct
and labor practices. In the Discussion section, we discuss
the implications of these ﬁndings in greater detail.

Discussion
Our study reveals important insights about the internal
structural conditions under which codes of conduct are
more likely to be coupled with improvements in labor
practices and the extent to which core production
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activities are more likely to be buffered from codes
by other organizational structures. First, we ﬁnd that
labor standards are less coupled to labor practices in
suppliers with high-powered productivity incentive
structures. Second, coupling is tighter in the presence
of two managerial structures: certiﬁed management systems and unions. Third, we identify important dependencies between these organizational structures:
management system certiﬁcations and unions attenuate
the looser coupling of labor codes and labor practices
associated with high-powered productivity incentive
structures, while high-powered productivity incentive
structures also temper the tighter coupling of codes and
practices associated with managerial structures. We also
ﬁnd support for the argument that certiﬁed management systems and unions complement each other in the
coupling of labor standards and practices. These ﬁndings
contribute in important ways to theory and practice.
Contribution to the Literature on Formal
Organizational Structures and Practices
First, our focus on the internal structural composition of
organizations to ascertain how coupling varies across
ﬁrms in challenging institutional environments signiﬁcantly extends a body of scholarship that has concentrated largely on the coupling force of institutional
factors external to organizations (e.g., Hafner-Burton
and Tsutsui 2005, Bromley and Powell 2012, Bartley
and Egels-Zandén 2016). We ﬁnd that even in emerging
economies—where labor regulatory institutions are weak
and efﬁciency demands are strong—some internal structures, such as certiﬁcation and unions, are associated with
tighter coupling of labor codes of conduct and labor
practices in suppliers and can attenuate buffering by
high-powered productivity incentives. This suggests
the need to reconsider the boundary conditions delineating environments in which coupling is more or
less likely. Since Meyer and Rowan (1977), the assumption that decoupling is likeliest in less-elaborated institutional environments has shaped the literature and
arguably has constrained the parameters of research.
Some recent studies ﬁnding gaps between companies’
formal human rights commitments and their actual
practices do not even entertain the possibility that
such commitments could be substantive rather than
symbolic (Lim and Tsutsui 2012, Berliner and Prakash
2015). This is an important arena for future research.
Second, we investigate the interaction of multiple
and potentially competing internal structures. To date,
studies have tended to examine the conditions under
which a single organizational structure is coupled to or
decoupled from organizational practices. But this approach ignores the complex and multifarious nature of
these structures inside organizations. Firms face multiple and competing institutional demands that become
sedimented into multiple and competing layers of
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organizational structure. It is crucial to appreciate the
internal interaction of these structures to understand
whether and when they will be coupled to organizational
practices. Our attention to the contingent relationships
among organizational structures also extends qualitative
research on internal (de)coupling processes that, to date,
has centered on the activities and interactions of individual actors, such as powerful managers (Fiss and Zajac
2004, Hallett 2010, Overdevest 2010), union representatives (Bartley and Egels-Zandén 2016), a new generation of differently trained personnel (Tilcsik 2010),
or boundary-spanning professionals (Edelman 1992,
Sutton and Dobbin 1996).
Accounting for how different conﬁgurations of internal organizational structures are related to the coupling of legitimacy structures (i.e., labor codes) and
organizational practices (i.e., labor practices) allows us
to advance theories of internal buffering. Going beyond
the stylized idea that legitimacy structures are cordoned
off from an organization’s core activities, we show that
legitimacy structures are not completely isolated from
other structures but rather are conditioned by these
structures. Speciﬁcally, efﬁciency structures can act as
a buffer to shield core labor practices from threatening
changes by labor codes, but managerial structures that
foster intraorganizational dialogue make it difﬁcult to
completely buffer practices from codes. Furthermore,
we show important interactions among efﬁciency
structures and managerial structures relating to the
buffering of legitimacy structures: efﬁciency structures
temper the reduced buffering of codes associated with
managerial structures, managerial structures attenuate
the heightened buffering associated with efﬁciency
structures, and multiple managerial structures can
complement one another to mitigate the buffering of
codes. These ﬁndings echo the rising strand of literature
on institutional complexity and on organizational hybridity encompassing multiple logics (e.g., Binder 2007,
Thornton et al. 2012, Besharov and Smith 2014). Consistent with this literature, we show that efﬁciency
imperatives and legitimacy imperatives can become
compatible when they are aligned in realizing organizational goals under certain internal structural conditions. Our study also shares afﬁnities with research on
channels of internal inﬂuence in organizations, including stakeholder receptivity (McDonnell et al. 2015), middle
manager involvement (Huy 2002), and executive ideology (Briscoe et al. 2014). Studies like these tend not to be
framed in terms of “internal buffering.” We believe that,
going forward, our elaboration of the concept of “internal
buffering” will provide a useful framework for analyzing
how external institutional pressures are translated internally to inﬂuence organizations.
Third, we directly theorize and test the association
between efﬁciency imperatives and coupling of legitimacy structures and practices. While the specter of
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efﬁciency demands looms large in decoupling studies,
they are not typically the object of empirical study. The
literature broadly assumes that the implementation of
legitimacy structures will be impeded by efﬁciencyrelated imperatives emanating from the organizational
environment. However, to understand the coupling and
decoupling of legitimacy structures, it is critical to recognize that environmental efﬁciency imperatives get
operationalized as formal organizational structures and
to investigate how these structures are related both to
organizational practices and to other organizational
structures. Our investigation shows that while some
efﬁciency structures buffer the internal impact of legitimacy structures, this can be mitigated by certain managerial structures. These ﬁndings extend understandings
about the relationship between legitimacy and efﬁciency
imperatives that lie at the core of the decoupling literature.
Last, we extend the literature on certiﬁcation to
management systems standards. Our supplementary
analysis reveals heterogeneity among certiﬁcation systems, highlighting the importance of continuous process
improvement and input from multiple units in designing
management systems. We found no statistically significant labor practice improvement among suppliers certiﬁed to prescriptive management system standards,
which impose a static set of objectives. Such certiﬁcations
are often used as a “seal of approval” to market good
practices to reputation-sensitive global buyers, though
we ﬁnd no evidence that adopters are particularly adept
at substantially improving those practices. Instead, our
ﬁnding that certiﬁcation is associated with greater improvement turns out to be driven entirely by generative
management systems, which emphasize continuous
improvement processes and input from multiple units
via self-assessment activities, without prescribing speciﬁc substantive outcomes. These ﬁndings contribute to
the handful of studies that have investigated whether
certiﬁcation to management systems standards in one
domain—such as environmental compliance or quality
control—can improve management practices in ways
that spill over into other domains (King et al. 2005,
Levine and Toffel 2010, Lim and Prakash 2017). And
they suggest the need for caution in assessing the value
of certiﬁcation and more nuanced attention to the design
features of different management certiﬁcation systems
when theorizing and testing their effects.
Contribution to the Literature on Labor Practices in
Global Supply Chains
Studies examining labor practices in global supply
chains have focused on external institutional determinants of compliance with privately imposed labor codes
of conduct, including civil society institutions (Seidman
2007, Vogel 2008, Anner 2012, Anner et al. 2013, Distelhorst
et al. 2015, Toffel et al. 2015, Bartley and Egels-Zandén
2016, James et al. 2018), state-based institutions like the
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stringency of domestic labor law (Locke et al. 2013,
Distelhorst et al. 2015, Toffel et al. 2015), and government
inspection practices (Amengual 2010, Amengual and
Chirot 2016). Our study extends this literature by
empirically investigating the internal organizational
structures that might impede or expedite suppliers’
compliance with labor codes.
We also provide important new empirical evidence in
the debate over the relationship of management systems
and unions. Some studies suggest that the two are
complementary (e.g., Bartley 2005, Rodriguez-Garavito
2005), others that certiﬁed management systems are
used as a substitute for unions (e.g., Esbenshade 2004,
Anner et al. 2013). Our ﬁndings provide evidence that
the relationship between these two structures is complementary in suppliers that have adopted both: each
enhances the positive association of the other with the
coupling of codes of conduct and labor practices.
However, complementarity might depend on suppliers’
willingness to engage in the kind of cross-organization
dialogue we theorize to cultivate and utilize information
provided by workers about workplace conditions. Studies
rejecting the complementarity of these two structures
tend to be in contexts where suppliers used certiﬁcation
strategically to crowd out unions (e.g., Esbenshade 2004,
Anner et al. 2013). We suspect that these structures may
very well lack complementarity if they are not implemented synergistically to increase cross-organization
dialogue, but future research is needed to identify the
precise mechanisms driving complementarity. This suggests the need for caution in assessing the value of certiﬁcation and for nuance in understanding the design and
function of different management certiﬁcation systems
when theorizing and testing their effects.
Our examination of high-powered productivity incentives contributes to the literature that examines the
relationship between labor standards and global value
chain incentive structures. Many have argued that supplier labor standards are largely shaped by the incentives
created by buyer sourcing practices (e.g., Bartley 2005,
Locke 2013). Others have examined how the internal
incentives created by “lean production systems” shape
working conditions. Lean production emphasizes waste
minimization and work ﬂow maximization to increase
productivity. Like the high-powered productivity incentives we study, lean production systems have been
criticized for their association with intensiﬁed workloads
and deteriorated working conditions (e.g., Landsbergis
et al. 1999, Parker 2003, Stewart et al. 2009). Yet, recent
studies show either mixed relationships (e.g., Jackson
and Mullarkey 2000, Hasle 2009) or positive relationships
(e.g., Locke and Romis 2007, 2010; Distelhorst et al. 2016)
between lean production and working conditions. We
extend this literature by exploring the relationship between labor standards improvement and a different type
of productivity incentive—piece-rate payment, and by
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showing how this relationship is conditioned by other
organizational structures. Our data only allow us to
investigate one type of productivity incentive, and we
encourage future studies to examine the relationship
between labor standards improvement and the many
different types of production incentive systems suppliers have instituted.
Finally, our ﬁndings provide important insights for
MNCs selecting suppliers and designing governance
regimes to improve labor practices. Many MNCs have
focused on long-term relationships with suppliers and
helping them improve their labor practices. Our ﬁndings
suggest that MNCs can strategically target suppliers
having managerial structures like generative certiﬁcations and worker participation, while being wary of
suppliers using piece-rate systems. Furthermore, because of the inﬂuence of economic incentives on labor
practices, altering the internal payment structure from
piece-rate to hourly may help. For suppliers that cannot
change their payment schemes systemically in the near
term, instituting alternative governance structures, including worker participation and certiﬁcation programs,
might reduce the negative inﬂuence of high-powered
productivity incentives.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are several limitations in our study. First, we do not
observe why the suppliers in our sample adopted various efﬁciency and managerial structures; for instance,
whether doing so was voluntary or coerced (and if so, by
whom) and whether structures were adopted symbolically with the intent to decouple them from practices. We
focus on postadoption outcomes rather than the conditions and motivations surrounding adoption. We acknowledge that adopters and nonadopters might differ in
many unobservable aspects, such as management attitudes and organizational capacity. Becoming certiﬁed or
unionized at different times or under different conditions
may also inﬂuence the improvement of labor practices
differently. Our data set does not enable us to empirically
disentangle these differences, which remain important
opportunities for future research.
Second, our data set lacks data on supplier proﬁtability
and many management characteristics—including the
use of productivity-enhancing structures other than
piece-rate payment—and on buyer–supplier order history and contractual terms, all of which might inﬂuence
suppliers’ improvement rates. We encourage future
research to consider the possible relationship between
different business models and improvement in labor
practices. In addition, we rely on existing literature to
hypothesize rather than directly observing the intraorganizational processes in suppliers. While the structures
we hypothesize are designed to promote intraorganizational dialogue, we cannot observe the extent to which
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they do. Additional qualitative research is required
to answer these important questions.
Lastly, ours is one of many papers that use audit scores
as a measure of compliance with labor codes of conduct
(e.g., Locke et al. 2007, Oka 2010, Ang et al. 2012,
Distelhorst et al. 2015, Toffel et al. 2015), but researchers
and other stakeholders should be aware of the limitations of audit reports for measuring improvements in
labor conditions. The improvement of audit scores
reﬂects changes in compliance as judged by auditors,
and auditor judgment is based on their review of
documented evidence (e.g., payroll records) as well as
their ability to interview workers and observe actual
conditions, which supplier management can seek to
impede.

Conclusion
Many skeptics have argued that organizational legitimacy structures are not associated with actual changes
in organizational practices. Our ﬁndings suggest that
the coupling of legitimacy structures and organizational
practices is conditioned by the organization’s internal
structural conditions, particularly the extent to which
the core organizational efﬁciency imperatives are buffered
from change or made more permeable to change by other
organizational structures. Our study suggests the need to
look beyond the symbolism of organizational legitimacy
structures and attend to how they can be associated with
actual implementation and improvement.
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Endnotes
1

International Organization for Standardization, https://www.iso
.org/management-system-standards.html.

2

As described below, robustness tests that account for variation in
this time lag between successive audits yield the same inferences as
our primary results.

3

We use suppliers and factories interchangeably, both referring to the
establishment audited. All supplier/factory-level variables are measured
at the establishment level. In addition, while it is possible that some of the
thousands of audited establishments in our data set might be owned by
a ﬁrm that operates multiple supplier factories, these establishments are
not owned by the buyers, which tend to be brands. Our social auditing
data does not include establishment names or ownership information.

4
As explained below, we also estimate supplier ﬁxed-effects models
based on the full sample that includes suppliers whose piece-rate
payment, certiﬁcation, or union status changes, which generate results largely consistent with our primary results.
5

Note that 8,323 is less than twice the number of focal audits because
some suppliers were audited more than twice in our sample period,
which results in 1,451 audits serving both as a focal audit in one
observation and as a prior audit in another observation.
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6

The terms of our data-sharing agreement require us to protect the
identity of the social audit ﬁrm that provided the data to us, which
prevents us from disclosing the full list of audit categories and how they
are aggregated and weighted to produce the ﬁnal score of labor practice.

7
Our model that predicts improvement (that is, Scorei,t – Scorei,t-1) while
controlling for the prior audit score (Scorei,t-1) is virtually mathematically
identical to a model that predicts the focal audit score (Scorei,t) while
controlling for the prior audit score (Scorei,t-1). That is, our current
approach can be expressed as (Scorei,t – Scorei,t-1) = β1Scorei,t-1 + β2Xi,t +
εi,t. Adding Scoret-1 to both sides yields Score i,t = (β1+1) Score i,t-1 +
β2Xi,t + εi,t. Note that these alternative speciﬁcations yield identical
coefﬁcients on our hypothesized variables (β2).
8

If some factories in our sample do not use piece-rate pay but instead
supplement their hourly wage scheme with other productivity incentives, such as production bonuses, that we do not observe in our
data, our estimated coefﬁcient on piece-rate payment should be considered the lower bound of the true impact of high-powered incentives.
This is because our estimates identify the difference between factories
that rely on piece-rate payment and all other factories and some of
those other factories might rely on other high-powered incentives.

9

For the full list of management system standards, see Table D1 of
Online Appendix D.

10

Nearly 15% of the establishments in our sample are certiﬁed to at
least one management standard, which is broadly similar to certiﬁcation rates among manufacturing establishments in China and in
the United States, according to our calculations based on data from
Bloomberg Terminal, the International Organization for Standardization’s 2016 ISO Survey, and the US Census Bureau’s Statistics of
U.S. Businesses. Because certiﬁed suppliers might be especially good
at keeping records, creating systems for managing problems,
and documenting changes—which could trigger improved audit
scores—we explored whether certiﬁcation was associated with improvements in the subset of audited labor practice items that are
based on physically examining shop ﬂoor conditions (rather than
process and system related issues that might be associated with better
record keeping). Examples of such items include the functioning of
machines’ emergency stop switches, the installation of ﬁre hoses,
the proper use of personal protective equipment, and the correct
labeling of chemicals and materials. Like our main results, we ﬁnd
that certiﬁed suppliers exhibit more improvement in labor practice audit items that are based on examining shop ﬂoor conditions
(β = 0.810, p < 0.01). This allays the concern that our main certiﬁcation
result is driven solely by certiﬁed establishments being especially
good at process and system issues like recordkeeping. As an aside, the
coefﬁcients on piece rate payment and workers’ union are quite similar
in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance across these two models,
which indicates that those structures are associated with comparable
degrees of improvement in both documented and examined items
of labor practices.
11
Audit team demographics not only might inﬂuence auditor scrutiny and thus audit score (Short et al. 2016), but also might cause
different amounts of knowledge transfer to be conveyed to and/or
received by the audited establishment (e.g., auditors could teach
suppliers how to remediate issues), which could inﬂuence the
learning and improvement that would be reﬂected in the next audit
score and thus in our improvement measure. We theorize neither the
net magnitude of these interconnected relationships nor their potential inﬂuence on improvement; we merely control for them, so as
not to risk omitted variable bias that could contaminate the estimates
of our hypothesized effects.
12
Because three control variables (paid by buyer, audit team average age,
and audit team maximum tenure) have moderately high correlations
between values measured at the focal and the prior audit, we investigated whether our inclusion of them measured at time t and time
t-1 (that is, these variables being measured at the focal audit and the
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prior audit) inﬂuence the coefﬁcients on our hypothesized variables.
We compared our primary model’s estimates to two alternative models:
a model that omitted these three variables measured at time t (the focal
audit), and a model that instead omitted these three variables measured
at time t-1 (the prior audit). Both of these alternative models yielded
coefﬁcients on our hypothesized variables that remained statistically signiﬁcant and of very similar magnitude to our primary
results (differences ranged from 0.3% to 4.4%).
13

For instance, the correlation of supplier’s size between the prior and
focal audits is 0.96 and the correlation of female worker ratio between
the prior and focal audits is 0.86.

14
As a robustness test, we include three supplier-country–level
variables rule of law, press freedom, and FDI inﬂows, which yielded
nearly identical results. Because our main models use suppliercountry ﬁxed effects, including these supplier-country-level variables risks multicollinearity issues. We thus do not include them
in the main models.
15
A likelihood-ratio test indicates that our main model (Column 1)
provides signiﬁcantly more explanatory power than a model that
omits our three independent variables (certiﬁcation, workers’ union,
and piece-rate payment) (χ2 = 39.2; p < 0.01), and a Wald test assessing
whether the three independent variables in our main model are
jointly zero is strongly rejected (F = 48.6; p < 0.01).
16
Noting that audit team maximum tenure (prior audit) and audit team
average age (prior audit) are highly correlated (ρ = 0.55), and audit
team maximum tenure (focal audit) and audit team average age (focal
audit) are highly correlated (ρ = 0.59), we reestimated our main model
(Column 1 of Table 2) except omitting prior and focal audit team
maximum tenure, and then, separately, omitting the audit team average
age variables corresponding to the prior and focal audit. This reduced the
magnitude of the signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on audit team maximum tenure (focal audit) and the magnitude of the signiﬁcant positive
coefﬁcient on audit team maximum tenure (prior audit) and led to
the coefﬁcients on both audit team average age (focal audit) and
audit team average age (prior audit) becoming nearly 0 and nonsigniﬁcant. This indicates that signiﬁcant coefﬁcient reported in
Table 2 on audit team average age (focal audit) is driven by
multicollinearity and should be interpreted with caution. The coefﬁcients on our hypothesized variables were nearly identical across
these alternative speciﬁcations.
17
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd positive signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on audit team
maximum tenure (prior audit) and mixed-gender team (prior audit) and
a Wald test statistic indicating that the negative coefﬁcient on allfemale team (prior audit) differs signiﬁcantly from the coefﬁcient on
mixed-gender team (prior audit) (F = 11.2, p<0.01).
18
Speciﬁcally, we reestimated our main model (Column 1 of Table 2)
except that we omitted paid by buyer (focal audit), and then, separately,
omitted paid by buyer (prior audit). This increased the magnitude of the
signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on paid by buyer (prior audit), and
rendered the coefﬁcient on paid by buyer (prior audit) signiﬁcant.
Coefﬁcients on our hypothesized variables were nearly identical
across these alternative speciﬁcations.
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